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Grand challenges are complex, large-scale problems requiring collaborative, multidisciplinary 
attention. Cross-sector collaboration can potentially play a significant role in addressing these 
challenges by capturing the diverse vision, experience, knowledge, and resources of different 
sectors.  Yet we still know little of the inter-organisational dynamics of how sectors work 
together to address grand challenges and the consequences of doing so.  Our paper contributes 
to the literature at the intersection of management and grand challenges by identifying how 
cross-sector collaborations can be used more effectively to address grand challenges.  Drawing 
on a study of Australia’s offshore processing of refugees we highlight the inter-organisational 
issues that emerge and develop a collaborative governance framework to overcome these 
problems and guide future cross-sector collaborations directed at grand challenges.    
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“If you have offshore processing, you have to outsource”  
Greg Lake, manager at the Nauru detention centre (Butler et al., 2014) 
 
“Politics had a way of making the simplest things complicated”  
Wilson Security Guard, Manus Island (Coates, 2018:281) 
 
 
In July 2010 Julia Gillard, the newly appointed Prime Minister of Australia, announced 
her government would commence processing asylum seekers’ applications outside Australia’s 
borders on the pacific islands of Manus and Nauru, a policy described as ‘offshore processing’.  
The management and operation of regional processing centres would be delivered by the 
private sector and not-for-profit organisations working together with the governments of 
Australia, Nauru, and Papua New Guinea.  A collaboration across the three sectors.  The 
Australian government’s policy change was in response to over 50,000 asylum seekers arriving 
by boat across the years 2008-2014 and an estimated 1,100 drownings at sea (Border Crossing 
Observatory, 2018), as large numbers of refugees across the Asia Pacific undertook the 
dangerous boat trip to Australia, prompting a refugee crisis.  Global refugee numbers remain a 
significant concern with over 60 million people currently displaced due to persecution, conflict, 
violence, and human rights violations (UNHCR, 2017). 
The refugee crisis has been described as a grand challenge, as it is complex, uncertain 
and evaluative (Ferraro et al., 2015).   Grand challenges cut across organisational, national, and 
state geographical boundaries and so the scale and complexity of addressing them is beyond 
the remit of any individual organisation (Salignac et al., 2018).  Governments have traditionally 
played leading roles in responding to grand challenges at the national and transnational levels 
to address problems such as sustainable development, climate change or refugees (Bebbington 
and Unerman, 2018; Kumarasiri and Jubb, 2016; McPhail et al., 2016).  Yet practical solutions 
to global problems more often involve local level interventions and changes to individual, 
organisation, or community behaviour (Lehman et al., 2016; Carter et al., 2013; Egan, 2014). 
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It is in this space we see an expanding role for private sector actors and not-for-profit 
organisations to work alongside governments through cross-sector collaboration.   
Cross-sector collaboration is “a distinctive form of working together, characterised by 
intense and interdependent relationships and exchanges, higher levels of cohesion (density) 
and requiring new ways of behaving, working, managing and leading” (Keast and Mandell, 
2014:9).  These can take the form of hybrid organisations that mix state, market, and civil 
society characteristics (Brandsen and Karré, 2011) or as partnerships1 where two or more 
sectors voluntarily collaborate to resolve intractable public policy problems (Selsky and Parker, 
2005). What makes collaborations distinct from other forms of cooperation or coordination 
amongst organisations is that these are relationships of reciprocal interdependence, where each 
cannot achieve their own goals without assistance from each of the other partners (Keast and 
Mandell, 2014). While initial research suggests cross-sector collaboration offer potential 
benefits to addressing grand challenges (Doh et al., 2018; Ballesteros et al., 2017), there 
remains much to learn about how they work in practice and what constitutes success.  
Government, business, and non-profits have different objectives, motivations, and 
stakeholders, which can create inter-organisational tensions and goal conflict that limit their 
effectiveness (Googins and Rochlin, 2000).   
Our purpose in this study is to gain insights into how cross-sectoral collaboration can be 
used as effective management tools for addressing grand challenges. We argue that cross-sector 
collaborations can play a central role because they harness the interdependent goals, expertise, 
and knowledge of each sector.  However, these innate differences require new modes of 
governance to address the management challenges of different organisational sectors working 
together. We propose a collaborative governance framework incorporating structural and 
                                                          
1 We avoid the use of the term partnership where possible, due to the distinct legal definition suggesting it 
applies to private commercial ventures. See for example the Partnership Act (Qld) 1891, which in s5 refers to a 
“business carried on with a view to profit”. 
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adaptive governance as two mechanisms to address the complexities arising from multiple 
organisations across sectors working together.  Cross-sector collaboration presents significant 
opportunities for resolving grand challenges and our findings add to the limited empirical 
evidence of how they work in practice and how to improve their strategic effectiveness in these 
settings.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section we describe the grand 
challenges facing organisations and society and review the literature on cross-sectoral 
collaboration.  We then outline the methods and findings of our study into the management 
challenges arising from Australia’s cross-sector collaboration to manage offshore processing 
of asylum seekers.  We conclude by discussing suggestions for improving the governance of 
future cross-sector collaborations in relation to grand challenges.   
 
2. Conceptual Overview 
Grand challenges are distinctive societal problems because they affect large populations across 
national, organisation, and local geographical boundaries. These problems are characterised by 
their complexity and uncertainty.  Hence developing effective responses to grand challenges 
requires “coordinated and collaborative efforts across societal stakeholders” (Linnenluecke et 
al., 2018). Cross-sector collaboration can potentially harness the views of a broader group 
looking for potential solutions to address global public policy problems. While only limited 
research has examined the use of cross-sector collaboration in relation to grand challenges, 
there is a rich extant literature of using collaboration, partnerships, or hybrid organisations to 
address social problems or environmental concerns (Doh et al., 2018; Bryson et al., 2006; 
Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006; Selsky and Parker, 2005).  Much of this research has recognised 
the prevalence of governments relying on private actors to deliver public services, such as 
through the public-private partnership (PPP) model (Börzel and Risse, 2005).  At the same 
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time, governments to varying degrees across the developed world have been turning to the third 
sector (sometimes called civil society or the not-for-profit sector) to co-produce delivery of 
public services (Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006).   
A review of this literature suggests two potential benefits for pursuing cross-sector 
collaborations.  First, collaboration creates increased opportunities for innovative problem-
solving and cooperation as diverse participants who may traditionally have competing interests 
work together (Head and Alford, 2015; Huxham and Vangen, 2000).  Participants are also 
motivated to find solutions, either through self-interest or altruism (Pasquero, 1991). For 
example, Doh et al. (2018) suggest cross-sectoral environmental entrepreneurship can 
overcome some of the constraints of individual sectors in adapting to environmental change.  
The second benefit is that it can facilitate the implementation of solutions as partners coordinate 
actions and share resources and experience as problems arise (Huxham and Vangen, 2000).  
Bringing sectors together captures greater knowledge, an array of skills, and different sector 
networks such as the case of private firms working alongside government and not-for-profits 
in the delivery of disaster aid (Ballesteros et al., 2017).   
The literature also identifies potential problems regarding the use of cross-sector 
collaborations.   There are significant differences between the characteristics, motivations, and 
time horizons of private, public, and non-profit organisations such that combining them is 
considered by some to be “potentially conflict-laden and risky” (Brandsen and Karré, 
2011:828). Cross-sector collaborators have very different goals and approaches to addressing 
social problems when they have distinctly different stakeholders (Parmigiani and Rivera-
Santos, 2011). For example, while corporations and for-profit firms may be beholden to 
shareholders and the need to report financial performance improvements on a quarterly basis, 
not-for-profit organisations account for their performance predominantly through delivery of 
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charitable objectives rather than simply financial growth.  This can lead to goal conflict, namely 
the difference in focus, scale, and time-horizon between different sector partners (Googins and 
Rochlin, 2000) and a blurring of the traditional boundaries between the state, market, and civil 
society (Billis, 2010).  Using the private sector to provide public goods also raises wider 
concerns for their use in grand challenges as “governments may begin abdicating their 
responsibility to these issues” (Doh et al., 2018:30).  There are also concerns that these ‘hybrid’ 
organisational forms are more difficult to control and less inclined to respond to the 
accountability requirements from their political agent organisations (Koppell, 2000).   
We argue that despite these concerns, cross-sector collaboration offers significant 
potential for management scholars looking for new and more effective ways of addressing 
complex social problems in relation to grand challenges. Yet we still know little of how they 
work in practice, how the issues raised above relevant to cross-sector collaborations and what 
(if any) are the implications for management when we move control beyond the nation state?  
These concerns are captured in the following research question: how can cross-sectoral 
collaboration be used as an effective management tool for addressing grand challenges? 
3. Framework for understanding cross-sector collaboration 
 
Analysing the effectiveness of a cross-sector collaboration in relation to a grand 
challenge involves observing and capturing the issues emerging across the lifetime of a project.  
Previous research suggests examining collaborations according to their chronological stages 
(Selsky and Parker, 2005; Googins and Rochlin, 2000; Bryson et al., 2006) and we find this a 
simple but useful framework for capturing management issues as they evolve over time.  
Following Bryson et al. (2006) and Selsky and Parker (2005), we frame our data collection and 
analysis around the stages of the collaboration process. The initial conditions that prompt cross-
sector collaboration are many and varied but are more likely to form in turbulent environments 
8 
 
(Bryson et al., 2006).  Using post-disaster procurement as an example, policy makers may be 
sceptical regarding whether individual firms are able to provide the solutions on their own and 
therefore favour collaboration (Doh et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2015; Ballesteros et al., 2017).  
The structure and governance of collaborations is influenced by environmental factors such as 
the strategic purpose of the collaboration and is also likely to change over time due to the 
ambiguity of membership and complexity of operating in local environments (Bryson et al., 
2006).  Implementation issues identified in the literature indicate that building legitimacy and 
trust and managing conflict are key to the success of cross-sectoral collaborations. Constraints 
to effective partnerships include competing institutional logics and goal conflicts that affect 
communication and governance arrangements. Finally, the outcomes and accountabilities of 
cross-sector collaborations are harder to define when there is complexity of shared 
responsibility and reporting arrangements.   
This chronological framing aims to capture the issues arising from the interplay of 
multi-sector organisational actors involved in delivering public policy solutions to grand 
challenges across the study period. It is expected that some of these actions might be aligned 
synergistically towards achieving the same outcomes or they may be competing against each 
other.  Highlighting the performance issues arising from these inter-relations provides the first 
step to understanding how we might manage these collaborations more effectively.   In the next 
sections we examine the formation, implementation, and outcomes of a cross-sector 
collaboration to manage regional processing of Australian asylum seekers during the Australian 
refugee crisis of 2008-2015.   
 
4. The research setting: the refugee crisis of the Asia Pacific and Australia’s response 
The total number of refugees worldwide increased significantly and consistently over the last 
four years (UNHCR, 2017).  The Asia and Pacific region is the third largest region hosting 
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displaced people and is currently home to 7.7 million people of concern, which includes 3.5 
million refugees, 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 1.4 million stateless 
people. The majority of these refugees originate from Afghanistan and Myanmar (UNHCR, 
2018).   
During the period 2008-2014 Australia faced a refugee crisis as increasing numbers of 
asylum seekers, mostly leaving from Indonesia, undertook dangerous open sea journeys in an 
effort to reach Australia. The number of arrivals by boat and claiming asylum increased from 
25 people per year in 2007-20082 to 25,000 arrivals in 2012-2013 (Phillips, 2017a).  Australia 
has a history asylum seekers arriving by boat since Vietnamese refugees began undertaking 
boat trips in the aftermath of the Vietnamese war (Figure 1).  In the intervening years numbers 
have remained small interspersed with occasional spikes (Phillips, 2017b) such as 1999-2001 
when approximately 9500 asylum seekers arrived by boat, mostly with the assistance of people 
smugglers. As a deterrent to future boat arrivals, the Australian government started intercepting 
boats (usually by the Australian Navy) and moving asylum seekers to offshore processing 
centres on Nauru3 and Manus Island (PNG), which were outside Australia’s migration zone.  
The legal effect of this change was to prevent asylum seekers from making applications for 
protection visas under Australian law, and instead their claims would be assessed under UN 
guidelines of these Islands.  Those processed and given refugee status (under the UN 
Convention) were then settled in Australia or a third country.   
                                                          
2 Statistics are shown in financial years.  For example, 1 July 2007 - 30 June 2008.  
3 ‘Nauru is a small island state in the South Pacific Ocean, approximately 3,000 kilometres from Australia. With 
less than 10,000 residents in a 21-square-kilometre area, Nauru is the smallest state in the South Pacific and 
second-smallest state by population in the world, behind only the Vatican City’ (Save the Children Annual 




Figure 1: Irregular boat arrivals to Australia 1976-2016 (Phillips 2017a) 
 
Management and operation of the offshore processing centres on Nauru and Manus 
Island was contracted during this time to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
an inter-governmental organisation that works closely with the UNHCR. While the policy of 
processing asylum seekers offshore was controversial, there was little criticism of IOM’s 
management of the centres. The policy of offshore processing was abandoned by the incoming 
Rudd government after the Federal election in December 2007. Soon after, the number of 
arrivals started increasing significantly (Figure 1) with more than 50,000 asylum seekers 
arriving by boat between 2008 and 2014 and an estimated 1,100 asylum seekers drowning 
while trying to reach Australia (Border Crossing Observatory, 2018).  Due to the significant 
number of arrivals over such a short time frame, onshore detention facilities quickly reached 
capacity4 and independent expert panel was established to find solutions. The expert panel’s 
report, released on 13 August 2012, included a range of disincentives aimed at reducing boat 
arrivals, including the re-establishment of offshore processing centres in the Republic of Nauru 
                                                          
4 27,000 asylum seekers were released into the community on bridging visas while their claims were being 
processed SMH (2016) Asylum seekers on bridging visas conditions. Sydney Morning Herald. Sydney: Fairfax.. 
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(Nauru) and Papua New Guinea (PNG) (Houston et al., 2012).  Three days later, the Gillard 
government passed legislation reverting to offshore processing of asylum seekers on the islands 
of Nauru and Manus (PNG)5. After Kevin Rudd returned to the Prime Ministership the 
following year, he announced that no refugee processed on Nauru or Manus Island would ever 
be resettled in Australia and instead would be resettled in third countries.  Intergovernmental 
agreements (MOUs) were signed with the Nauruan and PNG governments stating Australia 
would bear all the costs associated with construction and operation of the regional processing 
centres.    
The Australian government then entered into urgent negotiations with a number of 
private and not-for-profit service providers to operate the offshore centres6.  The initial 
contracts for running the offshore facilities on Nauru were signed between the Australian 
government with the private provider, G4S Australia and NZ, and not-for-profit organisations 
Save the Children and The Salvation Army.  The contracts were for the delivery of garrison 
support, to run the centres (such as security, cleaning, and catering), and welfare services 
relating to recreational and educational activities.  A summary of the garrison support and 
welfare services contracts over this period is shown in Figure 2. In total, these contracts cost 
the Australian government over $3 billion as at the end of March 2016 (Australian National 
Audit Office, 2016).   
                                                          
5 As a signatory to the United Nations’ 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the subsequent 
1967 Protocol, Australia has obligations to refugees who arrive on Australian soil as well as to those in camps 
offshore. Under the UN convention, a country’s obligations begin after an asylum seeker has entered a signatory 
country. The core obligation is to not send someone back into a situation of possible persecution. Another 
important obligation is not to penalise asylum seekers for entering a country without authorisation. (DIBP, 
2018). 




Figure 2: Garrison Support and welfare services contracts since 2012, Nauru and Manus Is (ANAO report No. 
16, 2016-17) 
 
The government engaged a separate private provider on Manus Island, Transfield 
Services (later re-named Broadspectrum), supported by Save the Children Australia and The 
Salvation Army.  17 months later, the Australian government consolidated the private contracts 
on both islands and Transfield Services took over the Manus Island contract from G4S and 
became the head contractor for the Manus Island regional processing centre.  Transfield then 
subcontracted a number of external providers for additional services, including Wilson Security 
to provide security services across both islands.  After the PNG high court deemed the offshore 
processing arrangement unconstitutional, the Australian government and PNG announced the 
Manus Island regional processing centre would close in October 2017.  Transfield’s contract 
was extended to this date although it did not wish to continue with the contract on Nauru after 
this time. Since then, a small number of private firms have been responsible for operating the 
Nauru and Manus Island centres. Primary and mental health services were contracted out to 
International Health and Medical Services (IHMS), a private health provider with existing 
contracts to manage health services across Australia’s onshore detention centres.  While other 
private businesses were contracted at various times in the construction of the centres, the seven 
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organisations examined here were the main actors involved in the management of offshore 
processing from the beginning. 
In sum, Australia’s move to offshore processing of asylum seekers in 2012 provides an 
interesting and important opportunity to examine the myriad management and governance 
issues that arise from cross-sector collaboration in relation to grand challenges and refugees.   
 
5. Methodology 
The research question is addressed using a longitudinal, documentary study of cross-sector 
collaboration in response to the Australian refugee crisis over the period 2012-2017. This 
period encompasses the entire time frame of contractual arrangements between participants 
from each sector for provision of services.  This follows a similar methodology to that used by 
McPhail et al. (2016), who examined the instruments and activities that constituted Australia’s 
asylum seeker policy in practice and how legitimacy and accountability is mediated through 
this policy. In contrast, this study aims to develop a deeper understanding of the operational 
issues that emerge from cross-sector collaboration and implications for the management and 
governance of these relationships.  The documentary analysis generates the evidence needed 
to address the complexity of solving grand challenges through an inductive approach focused 
on  “intertwined and evolving technical and social interactions” (Eisenhardt et al., 2016:1115). 
Hence, our methodology focuses on capturing the issues and problems that emerge from this 
complexity, triangulated from various organisational perspectives and exploring the key 
themes across each stage.   
 
5.1 Data Collection 
The first stage of data collection involved systematically reviewing all publicly 
available data on the management practices of the providers to capture these interactions.  The 
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period 2012–2017 covers the time offshore processing was reinstated as government policy 
(2012) and initial contracts signed with providers of offshore management7, until the closure 
of the Manus Island detention centre on the 31st October 20178.  A summary of the data source 
material is outlined in Appendix 1 and presented as panels according to the three sectors 
surveyed: government, private, and not-for-profit. The sectoral analysis is the first stage of 
triangulation in order to gather evidence of the perceptions of the various actors’ participation 
in the offshore processing of refugees. The second stage of triangulation comprises primary 
source documents and second stage documents.  Primary source documents included 
government policy announcements, senate reports and two major Australian National Audit 
Office (ANAO) Performance Reports into the procurement and management of offshore 
processing contracts. Primary source data for the private sector comprises company annual 
reports and related Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) announcements collected from the 
Connect4 database for Transfield/Broadspectrum, G4S Aust/NZ, and Wilson Security9. 
Primary source reports from the not-for-profit sector are available from the Connect4 database 
or directly from the organisations’ websites:  Save the Children and The Salvation Army. The 
bulk of the secondary source data comprises media/newspaper articles over the period 2012-
2017.  We developed a list of management terms derived from the management and 
organisation literature and analytical framework (e.g. risk management, costs, training, quality 
of staff), and applied these terms to each of the private and not-for-profit partners. The search 
resulted in 2,351 media/newspaper articles; the vast majority were not relevant or were 
repeated in multiple searches (where this occurred only one copy was retained).  We saved 
                                                          
7 The first contract was signed on 11/9/12 between the Department of Immigration and Border Protection 
(DIBP) and Transfield Services to provide facilities management and operational services to the regional 
processing centre on Nauru. 
8 The regional processing centre on Nauru is still in operation at the time of writing.   
9 Wilson Security became a subcontractor to Transfield/Broadspectrum after they took over the G4S contract.  
G4S had employed their own security personnel up to this point.  
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those articles that discussed the management themes identified, resulting in 152 relevant 
newspaper articles and a total of 196 documents.   
As an additional source of background (not tabulated) we referred to the book published 
by a former Wilson Security guard working on Manus Island about his lived experience 
(Coates, 2018).  This provided additional insights into managerial issues from the private sector 
perspective, and a first-hand view of what it was like to live and work on the Manus Island 
regional processing centre during this period.  
      
5.2 Data Analysis 
The first stage of data analysis involved detailed reading of the material collected from 
each of the organisational actors, as detailed in Appendix 1.  Through this process we 
developed a timeline of major events occurring across the two offshore processing sites and 
major political announcements of key policy changes.  The second stage involved a process of 
open coding the media/newspaper articles, government reports, and documents collected in 
line with Corbin and Strauss (2008).  The aim was to understand the inter-organisational issues 
and problems that were occurring or recurring through the different phases of the collaboration 
as outlined in the theoretical framework (Bryson et al., 2006). Two of the authors separately 
coded the data, resulting in 47 initial codes that captured the day-to-day operational issues 
emerging across the collaboration (e.g. experience, cost, cultural issues, resources, competing 
objectives, and defining success).   
In the third stage, higher-order themes were generated from the initial codes, involving 
examination of the management challenges emerging from these operational issues (Keast and 
Mandell, 2014). We traced these subjective viewpoints through the different levels and stages 
of the collaboration (Mandell and Keast, 2008; Bryson et al., 2006).  Following Gioia et al. 
(2013) we continually asked ourselves throughout this analysis whether these emerging themes 
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helped to describe and explain the key management issues we could see from the data around 
the refugee crisis. Appendix 2 outlines indicative quotes from the data that support the themes 
developed from this analysis.  
The fourth stage involved bringing the analysis to the level of theory development to 
understand the implications for the management of future cross-sectoral collaborations related 
to grand challenges. We reviewed the management themes in light of the extant collaboration 
and governance literature, again looking for overarching concepts that might explain and 
address the challenges emerging. From this we highlight a collaborative governance model and 
propositions attached to three inter-related dimensions: Design Configuration, Ambidextrous 
Management, and Accountability for Public Value - that pertain to formation and 
implementation of cross-sector collaboration.  Table 1 shows the iterations of data analysis 
through this process.  
 
 




Structural Governance                     Adaptive Governance 
 
WHAT ARE THE GOVERNANCE ISSUES? /APPLICATION TO DATA 
Design configuration 
 
Ambidextrous management  
 
Accountability for public 
value 
 
WHAT ARE THE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES? / PATTERN VARIABLES 
1A. Temporal challenges 
 
1B. Contractual processes 
 
2A. Managing uncertainty 
 










1A. Experience  
1A. Cost 
1A. Short time frame 




 2A. Management experience 
 2A. Quality of staff 
2A. Staff turnover 
2A. Resources 
 
3A. Activist stakeholders 
3A. Media pressure 
3A. Conflicting values 
3A. Leadership 
3A. Power 




1B. Performance measures 
1B. Responsibility 
1B. Reporting 
1B. Risk management 
 
2B. Facilities 
2B. Environmental conditions 
2B. Planning 
2B. Political changes 
2B. Cultural issues 
 
3B. Cost management 
3B. Quality 
3B. KPI’s 
3B. Defining success  
3B. Changing partners 
3B. Changing expectations  
Data                   Data                          Data                          
Table 1: Code Mapping: Three Iterations of Data Analysis (to be read from the bottom up) 
      
6. Findings 
6.1 Initial conditions of formation  
Our finding indicated the Australian government’s decision to contract out the management of 
the regional processing centres using a public/private/not-for-profit collaboration came about 
predominantly because of the temporal challenges associated with the crisis.   The processing 
centres were approved and established with little by way of formal hierarchical governance 
structures or clear responsibility lines.  Political pressure for an immediate solution to the crisis 
led to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) entering into contracts 
with a number of private and not-for-profit organisations without following the government 
mandated procurement rules (ANAO, 2016). There seems to have been little effort to learn 
from previous experiences of offshore processing to minimise contractual risks due to the short 
time frame. The DIBP was responsible for overseeing the set-up of the centres ready for asylum 
seeker arrivals.  In their formal response to the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) 
report into the procurement of contractors, the department reiterated the exceptionally short 
time frames expected by government for such a complex issue.   
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“The procurement of garrison and welfare services for clients at the RPCs [regional 
processing centres] in Nauru and PNG has been undertaken in a highly complex and 
rapidly evolving environment. When legislation was passed on 17 August 2012 enabling 
regional processing—four days after the release of the expert panel’s report—the 
Department needed to establish the necessary operational requirements immediately. 
Consistent with expectations, the first asylum seekers arrived in Nauru three weeks later 
on 14 September 2012. The Department met these requirements in an environment that 
was high-tempo, at the peak of national interest and complicated through logistics and 
uncertainties involved with processing in foreign countries. Delegates were required to 
make decisions on complex and high risk matters within very short timeframes. The 
environment remains extremely complex.” (Australian National Audit Office, 2016:16). 
 
The partners each contributed experience in delivering services in environments of high 
risk that did not exist in the DIBP.  As the chair of Transfield points out:  "Transfield has a 60-
year legacy of doing this sort of work in remote locations and difficult conditions," she says.  
"We are used to dealing with people who are under stress…Do we see the risk and do we go 
in with our eyes open? Of course we do, but we have got the view we have experience in this 
sort of work" (Sprague, 2014). 
 
6.2 Structure and Governance 
Our findings also indicate problems due to urgent time frames had a flow-on effect 
leading to a failure to put adequate contractual processes in place to oversee and monitor the 
operations of the collaboration.  
“The 2013 contracts specified a governance framework with two layers: senior 
management meetings (comprising individual service provider and joint service provider 
meetings) to address strategic matters; and a suite of meetings on location to deal with 
day-to-day operations…In practice, senior management meetings between the parties 
were held less frequently than required under the 2013 contracts. For Transfield, there 
were no DIBP records of individual service provider meetings in 2013. In addition, the 
department held one senior management meeting with Save the Children during 2014. 
This approach made it difficult for issues arising under the contract to be escalated and 
resolved.” (ANAO, 2017: 10). 
 
The data show a lack of formal and informal controls that were either not in place or were 
not appropriately followed, as well as ad-hoc monitoring of performance, in particular during 
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the first year of the contracts: “No systematic monitoring of performance occurred prior to 
implementation of the framework [in July 2013]” (ANAO, 2017: 12).  Although an 
‘appropriate framework of controls’ was in place that included authorisation of payments, the 
Australian Audit Office found documentary failures in adhering to this requirement:  
“This control was intended to provide additional assurance over payments under the 
contracts but did not always operate as intended. In respect to $2.3 billion in payments 
made between September 2012 and April 2016, delegate authorisations were not always 
secured or recorded: an appropriate delegate provided an authorisation for payments 
totalling $80 million; $1.1 billion was approved by DIBP officers who did not have the 
required authorisation; and for the remaining $1.1 billion there was no departmental 
record of who authorised the payments”. (Australian National Audit Office, 2017:9). 
 
There were also persistent questions around who was ultimately responsible for decisions 
in the regional processing centres.  The Australian government paid for everything, but there 
was uncertainty amongst the collaborative organisations regarding where the boundaries of 
responsibility lie, both legally and contractually, particularly when controversy arose.  
“The Immigration Department said the Manus Island Centre was "PNG-owned and 
operated". Security company G4S said it was the government calling the shots. … While 
Bowles [Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection] had firmly 
told the inquiry three times that PNG was "running the Centre", the evidence told another 
story.  "We had a contractual arrangement with the department, so the first port of call 
was with the department," G4S regional general manager Kevin Pye said (Whyte, 2014). 
 
Yet the Australian government clearly stated “the regional processing centre in Nauru is not 
run by the Australian Government. The RPC is run by the government of Nauru under its laws” 
(Australian Senate Select Committee, 2015).  Managing risks are key aspects of governance 
frameworks and the Department had some prior experience in this area with onshore detention 
centres and Christmas Island.  Yet significant failures to manage the risk were highlighted: 
 
“DIBP did not develop a transition plan to manage the changeover between the 2013 and 
2014 contracts, nor did it conduct a risk assessment to identify and mitigate risk. 
Significant risks materialised in the transition period, such as major riots which occurred 
on 16–18 February 2014.” (ANAO, 2017: 12). 
 
Contractual processes are used to ensure a framework of controls are in place for managing 
payments and variations.  Yet the DIBP’s finance team also failed to obtain confirmation that 
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invoiced services were genuinely obtained and correct, in accordance with the contract, prior 
to payment (ANAO, 2017:14). 
 
6.2 Implementation Issues 
Our findings indicate two distinct issues for management related to implementing this 
cross-sector collaboration: the ability of organisational partners to manage uncertainty while 
operating in environments of constant contextual ambiguity.  Overwhelmingly the data pointed 
to a highly uncertain environment that organisations were operating in on a day-to-day basis, 
but also across the wider political context in which they were contracting. Managers required 
leadership skills that prepared them for the unexpected as they responded to unanticipated 
issues on a day-to-day basis.  The context was also constantly changing and required immediate 
responses that could have significant consequences to the health and safety of individual 
workers and those within their care and responsibility.  These issues were also highlighted in 
the Cornall review into the riots at Manus Island in February 2014. 
“The number of transferees at the Centre grew very quickly from around 350 to 400 men 
accommodated in one compound to 1,340 single adult male transferees in four 
compounds… There was a very significant change in the nature of, and risk associated 
with, the Centre.” (Cornall, 2014:3-4). 
 
Cross-sector partners also operated in an environment of contextual ambiguity due to 
continual uncertainty and last-minute changes to contracts, organisations, political leaders, 
government policies, planned operations, and the physical environment in which they 
conducted their service delivery activities.  In these multi-national, multi-organisational 
situations this requires honesty in communication and high levels of trust among the partners 
(Salignac et al., 2019). Managers also needed to deal with multiple changes to the scope of the 
contracts and the places they would be operating. As Transfield stated in their formal response 
in the ANAO audit into procurement:  
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“The procurement by the Commonwealth of services with respect to the Offshore 
Processing Centres (OPC’s) involved multiple phases between 2012 and 2015 that 
evolved and changed over time. It included multiple changes in scope (including 
resettlement services), introduction of new service requirements and supply chains, 
transitioning in/out of other service providers and multiple new locations for service 
delivery.” (ANAO 2016:16). 
 
As well as planned changes, there were numerous unplanned changes.  For example, in 
February 2013 after a group of transferees burnt down one of the processing centres on Nauru, 
emergency accommodation and interim facilities needed to be organised for 400 asylum 
seekers while a new centre was built.  Organisations and managers needed to be able to respond 
to immediate changes and manage uncertainty as the following response by Transfield to the 
ANAO (2017) report again highlights the contextual difficulties of the partners: 
“The Draft Report (at least the extract provided to us) does not appear to address the 
complexity of the operations, the dynamic and changing conditions at the OPCs [off-
shore processing centres] nor the flexibility and responsiveness required of both DIBP 
and Service Providers to respond to the requirements of two very different sovereign 
governments with ultimate control over the legal and operating environment at the 
OPCs.” (ANAO 2017: 17). 
      
6.3 Constraints emerging from collaboration process 
Competing institutional logics were found to have impacted the collaboration process 
and actively limited the ability of members to operate effectively as a group. Multi-stakeholder 
tensions arose from intra-organisational and inter-organisational conflicts as sector partners 
faced pressures from activist stakeholders and media questioning their role in this issue:  
“Current and former Salvation Army staff who have worked offshore say they believe 
the agency had no idea what it was getting itself into when it signed its contract with 
the Commonwealth. ‘They are naive at best and at worst, they are doing damage,’ says 
a very senior and experienced aid administrator. ‘It's a long way from soup vans and 
caring for the homeless’ (Davies, 2013). 
 “Two of Australia's biggest superannuation funds have dumped shares in Transfield 
Services citing concerns about human rights inside the offshore asylum seeker camps 
the company runs for the Australian government. Another half a dozen other industry 




There were also tensions between sector participants as different motivations, goals, and 
objectives created on-going conflict regarding the use of resources, operational decisions and 
power sharing.   "Each agency wanted to be the lead agency, the head honcho of the 
island…The disorganisation of the Salvation Army meant it was a long way down the pecking 
order, and the staff suffered because of this" (Snow, 2014: quoting Salvation Army employee, 
Mark Isaacs).  These competing institutional logics can be seen in how differently each sector 
presented themselves:  
“Transfield said the increased cost of the contract was due to higher security costs, more 
complex travel needs and tax rates in PNG being higher than in Nauru... ‘We believe our 
success on this bid was due to our ability to rapidly mobilise for Nauru and our ability to 
manage that facility to the department's satisfaction.” (Towell and Gordon, 2014). 
 
“They [The Salvation Army staff] see the work that they’re doing as more of a mission 
than an actual job.  So they feel that they have a mission to be able to serve people, so 
first and foremost, that’s what we look for in our staff, and they’re the people that come 
to us. You know, we see that the asylum seekers over there are a very vulnerable group 
of people and they need a lot of love, they need a lot of support, and we’re the right kind 
of organisation to be providing that care and support for them.” (Waters, 2012). 
      
The Salvation Army did not have its contract renewed after January 2014, as it appears 
the organisation could not reconcile being paid to deliver a government refugee policy it 
disagreed with.  Reasons given by the government for ending the contract included contract 
failures, information security breaches and ignoring legal requirements that employees not 
discuss their work to media (ANAO 2017: 13). 
      
6.4  Outcomes and Accountabilities 
Establishing clearly defined outcomes and processes of accountability for the cross-
sector collaboration was problematic.  The Australian Audit Office referred to achieving “value 
for money”, and the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA 
Act) “requires entities to promote the proper use and management of public resources [which]... 
means efficient, effective, economical and ethical use” (ANAO, 2017:24).  Evidence from the 
data suggested the government as main contractor failed to manage the performance of the 
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collaboration or judge its outcomes against a set of clear strategic goals, including value for 
money:  
“The garrison support and welfare contracts were established in circumstances of great 
haste to give effect to government policy decisions and the department did not have a 
detailed view of what it wanted to purchase or the standards to apply. These are key 
considerations in achieving value for money.” (ANAO, 2017: para 8). 
      
The lack of accountability and clearly definable outcomes is most obvious in the failure to 
manage or even anticipate the numbers or costs of offshore processing.  This was most 
pronounced in the first two years of operation when the numbers of arrivals or departures of 
asylum seekers were completely unknown.  
“The offshore processing centres are rapidly being expanded. The Minister says the 
detainee numbers of 1,194 on Manus Island and 765 on Nauru will be more than double 
by the end of the month. This comes as the government claims a further cost blow-out 
for offshore processing. Scott Morrison says the Immigration and Finance departments 
have found that the funding for the coming year is $370 million short, leading to 
shortfall of 1.2 billion over the next four years.” (Barlow, 2013).  
The findings suggest processes of accountability were limited or confusing, resulting in overall 
performance and partner expectations being very difficult to define for the collaborative 
partners.   
 
7.  Collaborative Governance to overcome design and process issues 
We have argued that cross-sector collaboration has the potential to address grand 
challenges. Yet the findings highlight numerous design and implementation/process issues that 
limit their effectiveness. Literature suggests that collaborative governance can mitigate such 
issues (Le Ber and Branzei, 2010). Taking a collaborative governance10 approach focuses on 
“the design and use of a structure and processes that enables actors to direct, coordinate and 
allocate resources for the collaboration as a whole and to account for its activities” (Vangen et 
                                                          
10 While Vangen et al. (2015) argue that collaborative governance or governance for collaboration are 
analytically distinct, we find our example overlaps with both these definitional constructs and have simply 
chosen one for simplicity. 
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al., 2015:1244).  Collaborative governance ensures that participants bringing their (often 
opposing) sectoral frames achieve the goals of the collaboration (Vangen et al., 2015; Keast 
and Mandell, 2014) and bridge the gap between the management issues that emerged over the 
course of the collaboration and the governance challenges they present for effective cross-
sector collaborations: 1) Design configuration; 2) Ambidextrous management; and 3) 
Accountability for public value.  We suggest two specific collaborative governance 
mechanisms and propositions to address these challenges: structural governance and adaptive 
governance. 
7.1 Structural governance to resolve design configuration challenges 
At the outset, a cross-sector collaboration involves complex design considerations that 
configure a structure informal enough to meet the flexibility required when faced with temporal 
challenges.  Yet at the same time, formal contractual obligations are required to create 
opportunities and incentives to meet the innovation needed to generate solutions to grand 
challenges (Colquitt and George, 2011).  Contextual factors will influence the structure of the 
collaboration (Bryson et al., 2006), and as we observed here temporal challenges led to a lack 
of clearly defined contractual obligations from the outset (ANAO, 2016 2017). Given the 
urgency of the situation, the diversity of partners and the fact they had not worked together 
before, it was important that contracts set out clear and effective monitoring and reporting 
processes.  Contract partners to the collaboration were also changing during this period and so 
flexibility in the agreements to react to constant change was needed.  Structural governance 
mechanisms that are dynamic enough to respond to the ambiguity and complexity of 
collaborations are therefore essential (Bryson et al., 2006).  Organisation theory points to the 
importance of structure in influencing organisational effectiveness (Milward et al., 2009).  As 
Vangen et al. (2015) suggest: “the structure determines not only who (organisations and 
individuals) are able to influence the collaboration’s agenda but also who may take important 
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decisions and have resources, power and legitimacy to act and be accountable for its 
undertakings” (p.1246). The success of inter-organisational collaborations also depends on 
cooperation between partners, but different structures can impact cooperation (Williams, 
2005). In light of these considerations, we propose that:  
Proposition 1:  
The structural design of the cross-sector collaboration creates incentives and constraints that 
will influence a collaboration’s overall effectiveness.  
 
7.2 Adaptive governance to encourage ambidextrous management 
 
Radical forms of uncertainty underpin grand challenges as actors struggle to decide future 
paths of action (Ferraro et al., 2015).  We find managers operate in environments of persistent 
ambiguity that requires constant decision-making under uncertainty as each sector organisation 
contributed their distinct expertise and operational experience, yet each day presented new, 
unforeseen challenges. We suggest that overcoming the problems of uncertainty and ambiguity 
requires ambidextrous management.  That is, a management mindset to use and refine existing 
capabilities, networks, and relationships (exploitation) while at the same time creating new 
knowledge, opportunities, and solutions that overcome existing knowledge deficiencies 
(exploration) (March, 1991; O'Reilly and Tushman, 2013).  The literature indicates managers 
can influence exploitations and exploration at multiple levels through a balance of formal and 
informal processes and supporting structures that encourage ‘best practice’ while 
simultaneously allowing local managerial discretion and judgement (Turner et al., 2013). 
The context revealed that managers who responded quickly to problems, such as 
improving the quality of training or removing underperforming staff, increased the likelihood 
of meeting the goals of the collaboration. These organisations demonstrated the ability to learn 
from their experiences and improve their management processes over time, resulting in their 
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contract being extended and expanded. For example: “Transfield Services says it has made 
sweeping changes to security and behaviour management at the Manus Island and Nauru 
processing centres since it won $1.2 billion in contracts to run the detention camps in the past 
two years” (Carter, 2014).   Whereas G4S did not have its contract renewed. 
We propose adaptive governance as a key mechanism to encourage ambidextrous 
management. Adaptive governance refers to ‘the ways in which institutional arrangements 
evolve to satisfy the needs and desires of the community given changes in understanding, 
objectives, and the social, economic and environmental context’ (Chaffin et al., 2014:56).  It 
emerged as an approach to managing uncertainty and complexity in social-ecological systems 
(SES) and govern common pool resources (Dietz et al., 2003). Adaptive governance 
incorporates a flexible feedback information system that adapts its rules in response to the latest 
changes in the operating environment. The information system includes resources, values, 
multi-level staff involvement, and latest uncertainty predictions (Chaffin et al., 2014). The 
essential component of adaptive governance then is to be prepared to change the rules as 
“institutions must be designed to allow for adaptation because some current understanding is 
likely to be wrong, the required scale of organization can shift, and biophysical and social 
systems change” (Dietz et al., 2003: 1909).  A crucial element of cross-sector collaboration is 
their adaptive capacity.  Adaptive governance offers an oversight approach that encourages the 
innovative solutions needed for grand challenges, but allows managers to learn from their 
mistakes due to decision-making under uncertainty (Keast and Mandell, 2014). 
 
Proposition 2: 
Adaptive governance enables managers of cross-sector collaborations to exploit opportunities 
and explore new and innovative solutions to managing grand challenges. 
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7.3 Adaptive governance to ensure accountability for public value 
The context and study of Australia’s regional processing centres emphasised competing 
institutional logics and a lack of clearly defined performance objectives were critical 
constraints for managing cross-sector collaboration.  The potential for collaborations to address 
grand challenges stems from the different resources, knowledge, capabilities, and experience 
each sector organisation brings.  Conversely, these same differences create multi-stakeholder 
tensions that can impede the success of the collaboration (Huxham and Vangen, 2000; Saz-
Carranza and Longo, 2012), which is to deliver public value (Page et al., 2015; Bryson et al., 
2006).  Public value creation is defined as “the extent to which a cross‐sector collaboration 
achieves its overarching and subsidiary purposes, meets applicable mandates, and achieves 
lasting and widespread benefits at reasonable cost that no single organization could have 
achieved alone in a democratically accountable way” (Page et al., 2015: 716).  Governance 
systems are needed to manage these competing institutional logics, as well as oversee 
accountability for results. Accountability is made more complex for collaborations given the 
breadth of horizontal and vertical relationships and the fact most decision-making is conducted 
away from the public gaze (Page et al., 2015).   “Accountability is a particularly complex issue 
for collaborations because it is not often clear whom the collaborative is accountable to and for 
what”  (Bryson et al., 2006: 51).  Ensuring cross-sector collaboration achieves accountability 
for public value requires a governance system that accounts for the contributions of each 
partner and the collaboration as a whole.  We propose that this involves accountability via a 
‘managing for results system’ that connects specific performance outcomes to specific partners 
to overcome competing stakeholder tensions, and uses the information strategically to improve 





Cross-sector collaborations are more likely to create public value when governance 
accountability systems incorporate strategic performance management information to improve 
operations.    
 
8 Discussion and Conclusions  
 
This study argues that cross-sector collaborations can be effective management tools for 
addressing the complex problems surrounding grand challenges.  However, these multi-sector, 
multi-organisational collaborations also present their own inherent challenges. Our study 
highlights that numerous management issues emerge as different organisations and sectors 
work together on a complex grand challenge, and we argue improved governance mechanisms 
can overcome these issues.   Problems during the formation phase demonstrate that timing and 
contractual processes limit the longer-term ability of managers to coordinate effectively.  These 
limitations could be overcome by planning the structural design configuration at the outset. 
This confirms previous findings that suggest structural processes are an essential part of 
collaborative governance as they set out who is able to influence its direction, priorities, and 
outcomes (Vangen et al., 2015). We contribute to understanding cross-sector collaboration for 
grand challenges by highlighting the important roles of ambidextrous managers when operating 
in highly uncertain, complex environments. Management of cross-sector collaborations require 
an expanded set of management skills and the capability to learn-as-you-go to exploit existing 
knowledge and processes and explore innovative new ways of operating.  Our findings suggest 
successful collaborations capitalise on different and competing institutional logics to deliver 
the superior performance ascribed to ambidextrous organisations (Dahlmann and Grosvold, 
2018).   Our findings also highlight the difficulties of managing competing institutional logics 
when multi-sector stakeholders work together.  This confirms previous research showing a lack 
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of formal and informal governance processes weakens the ability to hold collaborative partners 
accountable for outcomes (Bryson et al., 2006; Vangen et al., 2015).   
 The overall aim of cross-sector collaboration for grand challenges is to address 
complex social problems through multiple sectors and organisations working together. Our 
study finds that this requires new structural and adaptive governance mechanisms to ensure 
they deliver the goals of accountability for public value and symbiotic value creation across 
the different partners. Insights from our study of Australia’s offshore regional processing 
centres extends our collective understanding of existing models of cross-sector collaboration 
(Emerson et al., 2012; Bryson et al., 2006) by focusing on how they can be used as effective 
management tools for addressing grand challenges.  Given the complexities and uncertainties 
associated with grand challenges (such as refugees or climate change) there is unlikely to be a 
one-size-fits all governance model (Keast and Mandell 2014). Centralised governance systems 
that are top-down or state controlled cannot provide effective solutions for large-scale complex 
societal problems (Chaffin et al., 2014). While not entirely novel, we suggest that our findings 
identify common elements that apply to other models of collaboration for grand challenges.  
Our project has limitations.  The analysis was limited by the data available and relied on 
secondary data and newspaper reports which were not without bias.  Taking a longitudinal 
approach to data collection highlighted biased viewpoints from certain media and 
organisations, which we tried to overcome by seeking out viewpoints not as vocal, such as from 
the private and not-for-profit organisations.  Interviews would have overcome some of these 
limitations, but due to the controversial nature of the refugee policy, and confidentiality 
agreements of employees it was not a valid option.  Despite these limitations, a surprisingly 
rich data set was available.  While the amount of data from within each organisation was 
limited, there remains a wealth of information on the public record in addition to newspaper 
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reports.  This has enabled us to offer some useful preliminary insights into the management 
issues that emerge from cross-sector collaboration in relation to one grand challenge. 
 The refugee crisis is a complex and controversial subject, and we do not expect a 
consensus of viewpoints to emerge among readers on the morality or otherwise of the political 
response. Our goal is to understand what strategic insights emerged from this cross-sector 
collaboration and how they might apply to other grand challenges.  There is a large literature 
examining inter-organisational collaboration that we can draw on, yet few studies to date 
examine its application to grand challenges. This research offers some new ideas on managing 
the design and implementation of cross-sector collaborations. We identify three propositions 
for success that may be of interest to those in government, business, non-profits, the media, 
and community looking to understand its potential. Collaborative governance can overcome 
many of the management issues that emerged, but no two grand challenges are the same. Hence 
a commitment to continually adapt the governance and management systems is required if we 
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Appendix 1. Data Source Material 
Organization Documents Number 
Government   n 
Australian Government Australian National Audit Office Reports  2 
Independent reports commissioned by government:  3 
Hamburger (2013), Houston (2013), Cornall (2014), Moss (2015)   
Senate Committee Reports 3 
Parliamentary Library reports  2 
Prime Minister speeches  3 
Immigration Minister speeches  3 
PNG Government MOU between Australia & PNG  3 
Government of Nauru MOU between Australia & Nauru  1 
Private sector  n 
Transfield/Broadspectrum Annual Reports, 2012-2017  6 
ASX statements/media releases  4 
Media reports/newspaper articles* 2012-2017  25 
G4S Aust/NZ  Annual Reports, 2012-2014  3 
ASX statements/media releases  1 
Submission to Senate enquiry  2 
Media reports/newspaper articles* 2012-2014  11 
Wilson Security Media reports/newspaper reports* 2012-2014 22 
International Health and 
Medical Services (IHMS) 
Media reports / newspaper articles* 2012-2016 2 
Opening statement to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
References Committee  
1 
Not-for-profit sector  n 
Save the Children Australia Annual Reports, 2012-2015;  
Newspaper reports* 2012-2014  
4 
3 




Annual Reports, 2012-2013, 2014  2 
Media reports / newspaper articles* 2012-2016 89 
Heads of Agreement between DIAC & Salvation Army, 2012  1 
*many of the newspaper 
articles included some/all of 
the organisations operating on 
Manus and Nauru but were 
counted once in the search 
they first appeared. 
Total documents  196 




Appendix 2: Supporting Quotes  
      Second Order Supporting Quote Organisation & 
Sector 
 









“The Department of Immigration and Border Protection’s (DIBP) 
management of procurement activity for garrison support and welfare 
services at the offshore processing centres in Nauru and Papua New 
Guinea (Manus Island) has fallen well short of effective procurement 
practice. This audit has identified serious and persistent deficiencies in the 
three phases of procurement activity undertaken since 2012 to: establish 
the centres; consolidate contracts; and achieve savings through an open 





“The department did not put in place effective mechanisms to manage the 
contracts. Other than the contracts, there was no documentation of the 
means by which the contract objectives would be achieved. In the absence 
of a plan, assurance processes such as the inspection and audit of services 
delivered, has not occurred in a systematic way and risks were not 
effectively managed. In addition, the department has not maintained 
appropriate records of decisions and actions taken in the course of its 
contract management. As a consequence, the department has not been 
well placed to assess whether its service strategies were adequate or fully 
met government objectives.” (ANAO, 2017:8). 
 
Govt 












“The Salvation Army was a poor cultural fit and ill-equipped to manage 
the difficult situation at the Manus Island detention centre, a former 
worker has alleged. The worker, who has spoken on condition of 
anonymity, has described a "systematic failure" of the Salvation Army's 
work at the offshore processing centre in Papua New Guinea, including 
the way it handled allegations of rape among detainees and incompetent 
psychological care provided to asylum seekers. ‘There was no 
accountability, no structure, no case management system,’ said the 
worker, who was on the island last year. "There was no management plan. 
We had to make them up on the run." (Whyte, 2014). 
Not-for-Profit 
Salvation Army  
Contextual 
ambiguity 
“The procurement by the Commonwealth of services with respect to the 
Offshore Processing Centres (OPC’s) involved multiple phases between 
2012 and 2015 that evolved and changed over time. It included multiple 
changes in scope (including resettlement services), introduction of new 
service requirements and supply chains, transitioning in/out of other 
service providers and multiple new locations for service delivery. All of 
these factors are considered relevant to a balanced assessment of the 














A spokesman for the Salvation Army says its position on detention had 
not changed. "We are opposed to offshore processing and are on public 
record as saying so. Our preference would be that people are processed in 
the Australian community, without the need for offshore processing.  But, 
we work where there are people in need and where there is the suffering 







“The department developed a comprehensive and risk based performance 
framework for the contracts to help it assess provider performance. 
However, development of the framework was delayed and in applying the 
framework the department was not consistent in its treatment of different 
providers. Performance measurement under the framework relied heavily 
on self-assessments by providers and the department performed limited 
independent checks. Delays in the department’s review of self-
assessments and the provision of feedback on contractor performance 
eroded the link between actual performance and contract payments.” 
(ANAO, 2017: para 11). 
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